University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Management Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

2002

Banking on Gambling: Banks and Lottery-Linked Deposit
Accounts
Mauro F. Guillén
University of Pennsylvania

Adrian E. Tschoegl
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Guillén, M. F., & Tschoegl, A. E. (2002). Banking on Gambling: Banks and Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts.
Journal of Financial Services Research, 21 (3), 219-231. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1015081427038

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/62
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Banking on Gambling: Banks and Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts
Abstract
Deposit accounts that provide an interest return determined by a lottery have proved to be popular around
the world. From the point of view of a bank, these products are especially successful among relatively
low-income customers, or in markets in which many people are outside the banking system. Below, we
describe numerous examples of such accounts, and analyze their economics.

Keywords
randomized return, lottery, behavioral finance

Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/62

Financial
Institutions
Center

Banking on Gambling: Banks and
Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts
by
Mauro F. Guillén
Adrian E. Tschoegl
00-25

The Wharton Financial Institutions Center

The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to
the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for competitive
excellence. The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk at the firm level
as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center. The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as they
pursue competitive excellence.
Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center. If you would like
to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please let us
know of your interest.

Anthony M. Santomero
Director

The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous
grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

BANKING ON GAMBLING: BANKS AND LOTTERY-LINKED DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS

Mauro F. Guillén
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
Email: guillen@wharton.upenn.edu

Adrian E. Tschoegl*
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
Email: tschoegl@alum.mit.edu
April 2000

* Corresponding author. We would like to thank Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Mark
Zbaracki for helpful comments on an earlier draft and Witold Henisz for a helpful
discussion. We would also like to thank Citibank whose generous grant to the Wharton
School supported the research of which this is a by-product. In addition, numerous
regulators and bankers gave generously of their time to answer questions. Lastly, C.
Muñoz, A. Ripert, I. Corominas, and P. Freire provided able research and logistical
support for the original project. Still, the analysis and opinions in this paper are ours.

2

BANKING ON GAMBLING: BANKS AND LOTTERY-LINKED DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
Abstract
Lottery-linked deposit accounts have proved to be popular around the world. From the
point of view of a bank, these products are especially successful among relatively lowincome customers, or in markets in which many people are outside the banking system.
Below, we describe numerous examples of such accounts, and analyze their economics.
1 Introduction
Banks continually search for new products to offer depositors. One product available
in many countries around the world is the lottery-linked deposit account (LLDA). Their
ubiquity is a testament to a popularity that transcends particular cultures and societies. The
development of the Internet, and especially the development of Internet gambling,
suggests that one can expect these accounts soon to be available in markets where they are
not currently offered. This alone makes the LLDA a phenomenon worthy of further
examination.
Governments and banks around the world have introduced savings instruments that
automatically enroll the holder in a lottery. The basic structure of LLDAs is simple.
Typically, the bank automatically enrolls in a lottery those depositors who maintain a
deposit of some specified size for some specified period in the designated accounts.
Commonly, the depositor receives one “lottery ticket” or chance, each month for every X
dollars he has on deposit for that month. The buyer pays for her lottery tickets by
foregoing interest relative to an account that does not have the lottery feature. The lottery
does not affect the principal of the bond or deposit, but the interest rate that the holder
receives each period is a random variable. The interest rate the holder actually receives
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could be very low—perhaps zero or only nominal, depending on the scheme’s structure—
or it could be very high if the owner is lucky enough to win the grand prize.
The issuers’ incentive to offer the accounts or bonds is that savers like the lottery
feature and reward the issuers by accepting a lower return on the accounts than they
would receive on an account that provided a certain return. That is, the account holders
accept a bet that is unfair to them. Table 1 below gives some data from then Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya (BBV) on the number and value of such accounts in its Latin American
subsidiaries. The literature on gambling suggests that the payoff structure of the LLDAs
should have certain characteristics — skewed returns and mechanisms to reduce holders’
fatigue from the low likelihood of winning — and this is in fact what we observe.
Section 2 provides a number of examples from both the published literature and from
the authors’ own inquiries. Section 3 describes the accounts and discusses their
economics. Section 4 discusses some public policy considerations. Lastly, Section 5 is the
conclusion and a call for further research.

2 Lottery-linked bank accounts around the world
Lottery-linked bonds and bank accounts are not a new idea. We have identified a
number of examples, of which the first set below involve bonds. The second set we
describe involve bank accounts. The order of presentation is roughly historical.
UK and France: Weir (1989) and Weir and Velde (1992) report that in the 17th and
18th century, the governments of England and France issued various securities with what
the authors call “externally randomized returns.” Instead of paying a set rate of interest,
the government periodically paid a premium to a subset of the holders of the securities—a
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subset determined by lot on each occasion. The UK still has Premium Savings Bonds that
pay 3.75% p.a. (from 1 March 2000), automatically enroll the holder in a monthly lottery
with prizes ranging from £50 to £1,000,000, and are free of all UK Income Tax and
Capital Gains Tax. The minimum investment per owner is £100, the maximum is £20,000,
and the bonds are not transferable.
US: Jennings et al., (1988) report that Alexander Hamilton proposed that the US
introduce bonds with a randomized return. His objective was to find ways to fund the U.S.
national debt. Calomiris (1991) suggests that the US government used such securities
when issuing debt abroad in the 18th Century.
Sweden: Green and Rydqvist (1997) report that since 1918, the Swedish government
has offered bonds that have coupon payments determined by lottery.
These bond market examples, except perhaps for the UK’s premium bonds, may
represent a targeting of a different clientele than that which state lotteries and LLDAs
target. Smith and Villamil (1998) propose a model that suggests that governments would
issue lottery-linked bonds to achieve an optimal sharing of the burden of large budget
deficits in the face of private information about access to assets. They argue that their
argument implies that one should not often observe explicit randomization in private
contracts. However, as we show below, LLDAs are common form of private contracts
with randomized returns.
LLDAs have appeared in a number of countries and all our examples are from the
second half of the 20th century. LLDAs may have existed earlier; we just have not
uncovered any examples in the economics literature. Both private and government-owned
institutions have offered the accounts.
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Japan: Minabe (1975) reports that the Japanese government offered LLDAs after
World War II, probably in its postal savings system though he does not make this clear.
LLDAs initially represented 82% of all time deposits and still represented 75% in 1962.
By 1975, however, their popularity had apparently dwindled almost to nothing and the
government ended the program.
However, in November 1994, the Jonan Shinkin Bank, a small cooperative bank in
Tokyo introduced lottery-linked 1-year time deposits despite Ministry of Finance (MOF)
disapproval. The MOF was unable to block the introduction as deregulation of banking
had limited its powers. The National Association of Shinkin Banks had earlier that year
formulated a rule against offering cash premiums to depositors and it condemned the bank
for disobeying the rules. However, Jonan Shinkin attracted some Yen30 billion (US$305
million) into the bank in a matter of days (Hulme 1995). Thirteen other shinkin banks
immediately took up the idea.
Turkey: Cosar (1999) mentions that Demirbank offered LLDAs in the 1950s.
Kenya: Since 1978 the Kenya Post Office Savings Bank has offered a Premium Bond
Scheme based on bearer bonds in denominations of Ksh 10 (US$0.14) and Ksh 20.
Apparently the scheme met with great customer enthusiasm and the bank is considering
offering bonds with denominations of Ksh. 500 to Ksh 10,000 (Wright 1999).
Indonesia: In 1986, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) introduced the SIMPEDES
program as a way of mobilizing deposits (Morduch 1999). BRI is a bank that specializes in
microfinance lending to “better off” poor and non-poor households. While apparently
quite successful on the loan side, the bank had less success in garnering deposits until it
introduced the SIMPEDES accounts; these permit unlimited withdrawals and offer a

6

lottery. Interest rates range from zero to 1.25%/mo. for large (over US$100 equivalent)
deposits, but even for large deposits are barely above the rate of inflation. Even so,
between 1988 and December 1996, the number of depositors rose from over 4 million
households to over 16 million. The average depositor appears less well off than the
average borrower. Morduch (1999) reports that the accounts give BRI a relatively cheap
source of funds for its lending while permitting households to build up their assets and
smooth consumption.
Spain: Until the late 1980s, the banking sector in Spain was a cozy cartel. Starting in
1990, the competitive environment changed. Banco Santander, then Spain’s second largest
bank, set off a war for deposits among the large banks by offering interest on current
accounts. (It did so in response to the initiatives of foreign banks’ Spanish subsidiaries.)
BBV, its chief rival, introduced its el libretón, an account that offered lower interest rates
than Santander’s supercuenta, but which enrolled their owners in a periodic lottery with
prizes such as cars, trips, encyclopedias, and cash. Santander and other Spanish banks then
introduced their own LLDAs. Later, when the Spanish banks entered retail banking in
Latin America, they brought the idea of LLDAs with them.
Mexico: In August 1996, BBV Probursa, introduced the libretón, a move that Banco
Santander México matched. BBV Probursa reports that its share of Mexican deposits
grew from 2.5% in 1996 to 8% in 1997, due both to the LLDAs and other competitive
moves. Locally-owned banks such as Banco Nacional de Mexico, Inverlat, and perhaps
others also have since offered LLDAs.
Argentina: Banco Río, Banco Santander’s subsidiary, introduced the accounts on a
Monday in December 1997; BBV Banco Francés, followed that Friday. Banco Río’s
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lottery-linked accounts participate in a daily lottery for $20,000 and a monthly lottery for
$222,000 (about 20X average per capita GDP of US$11K at PPP in 1998). Each US$200
on deposit gives the depositor one ticket in the lottery. The bank maintains a special phone
number where customers can find out both the odds and the previous winning number.
Also, a well-known radio station announces the winners each day at 12:15 pm. BBV
Banco Francés’ lottery offers cars, household appliances and other similar goods as prizes,
as well as cash. Banco Francés offers one chance per $250 in deposits and a top prize each
month of $250,000 (about 23X average per capita GDP). It announces its results on a
popular evening TV program.
Both Banco Río and BBV Banco Francés report sharp increases of about 20% in their
deposit and customer base within six months of the introduction of these products. Banco
Francés reports that the accounts raised the bank’s market share of Argentine deposits
from 7% to 10% within 3 months. When the Spanish banks introduced the accounts the
local banks disapproved. As of mid-1998, the local banks had not introduced similar
accounts although some local executives report that they considered doing so. Still, the
lack of response may have represented nothing more than a reaction lag.
Pakistan: In May 1998, Pakistan and India conducted nuclear tests. The US
responded by imposing sanctions on both countries. The government of Pakistan,
concerned about possible balance-of-payments consequences, froze foreign currency
accounts and allowed withdrawals only in rupees. The result was a huge liquidity crunch
as depositors withdrew their funds. The banks warned the government that if they could
not use innovative schemes then the banks would not have the funds to lend to the

8

government, let alone industry. The government authorized the offering of LLDAs in July
of 1998.
Habib Bank, government-owned and the largest bank in Pakistan, launched its crorepatti (multi-millionaire) in which the grand prize is R10 million (approx. US$217,000;
about 130X average per capita GDP of US$1.7K at 1998/99 PPP). Muslim Commercial
Bank, the fourth largest bank, launched its maala-maal account. At Bankers Equity term
deposits of 3, 6 and 12 months carry interest rates of as much as 10% per annum (for the
12-month deposit) plus they qualify the depositor for participation in a monthly prize
drawing. United Bank, also government-owned and Habib Bank’s main rival, offers
depositors who maintain a minimum deposit throughout the month a chance at a prize of a
new car. It reportedly gained nearly Rs. 1.5 billion in deposits within two months. Other
banks offer cash, motorcycles, televisions, computers and electronic gadgets.
The banks advertised the new accounts, which proved to be an instant success. Habib
Bank reports that the accounts brought in some R10bn (US$217mn) in deposits between
July and January 1999. The much smaller bank, Bankers Equity, reports that its lotterylinked deposit scheme drew R1bn in new accounts.
In May 1999, the Council on Islamic Ideology, the highest Islamic council in Pakistan,
ruled that bank lottery schemes were un-Islamic. The Pakistani government announced
that it would not challenge the ruling. On 23 December 1999, Pakistan’s Supreme Court
upheld a 1991 ruling by the Federal Shariat (Islamic Law) Court and ordered the
Government to pass the necessary laws to phase in an interest-free banking and financial
system by the year 2001.
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The grounds for declaring the accounts un-Islamic were that the prizes are de facto
interest. Many if not all interpretations of the Koran do not distinguish between interest
and usury and take the prohibition on usury as forbidding interest (Aggarwal and Yousef
2000). The courts could have condemned the accounts on the grounds that the Koran also
prohibits gambling or speculation but didn’t.1
The State Bank of Pakistan has now ordered the banks to stop offering the products
within Pakistan but permits them to offer them to non-residents remitting funds to
Pakistan. However, the major sources of remittances are Pakistani residents of Saudi
Arabia, the UAE and the UK. The Pakistani banks have no offices in Saudi Arabia and
banks are prohibited from advertising such schemes in the UK in competition with the
UK’s premium bond scheme; as a result, the banks apparently are stopping altogether.

3 Lottery-linked bank deposit accounts
In the analysis of LLDAs below we will first discuss the accounts from the supply
side, that is from the banks’ point of view. Then we will turn to the demand side, that is to
the depositors’ point of view. For both we will first discuss issues of costs and then issues
of benefits.
For the bank offering the LLDA, the monetary cost is deterministic, not random. It
announces the payout in advance and unlike the situation with many state lotto games, all
prizes are awarded and there is no rollover. The banks can explicitly index the number and
value of the prizes to the number of qualifying accounts to maintain a target expected
value. Equally, competition between banks should lead at least to implicit indexation.
1

We would like to thank Mark Zbaracki for pointing out that the accounts combine three sins: usury,
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Offering LLDAs is subject to economies of scale. The bank has to invest in the
computer program to assign the chances or “tickets” to accounts, and to pick the winning
ticket. It also has to advertise the accounts. These investments are a fixed cost that does
not increase with the number of accounts the bank holds. There may also be another
benefit to scale. Small banks cannot match the large banks in terms of the frequency and
the richness of the prizes. Clotfelter and Cook (1990) point out that this matters to the
demand for a lottery and has resulted in several small U.S. states banding together to offer
joint lotteries. Although a small bank with its less frequent prizes may match a larger bank
in terms of the (negative) expected value of its accounts, it may suffer from a marketing
disadvantage. As Kahneman and Tversky (1973) have discovered, people often predict by
representativeness and over-estimate the probability of rare, salient events. A ban that
advertises winners more frequently than its competitors may benefit from such effects.
Lastly, the larger bank can more readily increase the skewness of its payouts, an issue we
will return to shortly.
Banks offering LLDAs have to know how to market the accounts. This involves not
just advertising, but also the management of the prizes in terms of their structure and
composition. The Spanish bankers with whom we spoke reported that periodically their
banks would have to change the prizes to maintain customers’ interest.
The banks offer the accounts to lower their cost of funds. When the lottery is not a
“fair game” i.e., when the expected value of a ticket is less than the foregone interest, the
bank gains. (Both regular deposit accounts and LLDAs require administration and we
have no sense that the administrative costs are higher for LLDAs than for regular

gambling and greed.
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accounts.) Discussions with executives at Banco Santander and BBV confirm that the
LLDAs are a cheaper source of funds than regular savings accounts, even after one takes
into account administrative costs and prizes.2
The bankers we spoke with believe that these products are especially successful with
low-income depositors and in cases where there are lots of people outside the banking
system. The Spanish banks believe, though no systematic studies exist, that the LLDAs
enabled them to grow in those Latin American countries where they introduced the
accounts by attracting new customers as well as stealing customers from other banks. The
examples we cited in Section 2 above suggests that the LLDA are products that grow the
size of the market in countries with low deposit-to-GDP ratios or with lots of people
lacking an account. That is, the accounts draw in customers for whom savings plus a
gamble has a higher utility than either holding savings in cash or consumer durables, or
possibly immediate consumption. Unfortunately, we know neither the scale nor the source
of any increase in measured savings.
The suppliers’ benefit is the demanders’ cost. If the banks are offering less than a fair
bet, this means that holders of LLDAs must be receiving a negative expected return in
monetary terms. (We will return to this issue below). Note, there is no issue of a foregone
risk premium; finance theory has it that as the randomized returns on the LLDAs do not
co-vary with the market (or priced factors), there is no need for a risk premium.
Paying for one’s ticket by foregoing interest means that once one has opened the
account, one does not have to do anything further; the participant does not have to reach

2

We conducted interviews with bankers and regulators in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Spain between
May and July of 1998. Our interviews focused on the entry of the Spanish banks in Latin America. That
led to the discussion of LLDAs.
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into her purse each month to pay for her ticket for that month. The evidence in Kahneman
and Teversky (1979) on individuals’ asymmetric valuation of gains and losses suggests
that this may be an attractive characteristic of the LLDAs.
Relative to government lotteries, the LLDAs have the disadvantage that depositors
cannot choose the number on their ticket. As Farrell et al., (2000) show, this is an
important feature as participants apparently value the opportunity to buy “lucky” numbers.
Similarly, Clotfelter and Cook (1991) found that many players believe that they can
improve their chances of winning by adjusting their bets to reflect recent winning numbers,
or signs from dreams or events in their lives. However, conscious selection leads to
bunching of bets, making tickets in government lotteries that permit the feature much
harder to value than tickets in an LLDA.
The lotteries generally deliver a large number of small prizes and a small number of
large prizes. The large prizes create skewness in returns. The frequent small prizes combat
account holders’ fatigue by reinforcing their continued interest despite the rarity of big
wins. This payoff structure is also consistent with Quiggin’s (1991) model, which takes as
its starting point an assumption that bettors care about how their wealth compares to that
of others (rank-dependent utility). Robson (1996) makes an argument that he bases on
biological evolution for utility functions that have relative success as an argument of the
function. In his model, those individuals who take fair bets will take fair bets that involve a
high probability of small losses with a small probability of large gains. Similarly, Golec and
Tamorkin (1998) find that bettors at the racetrack may value skewness, i.e., the possibility
of a big win, rather than variance. Lastly, Brenner’s (1986) analysis of Canadian data
shows that the people who buy lottery tickets are likely to be persons who see the lottery
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as offering them an opportunity of recovery after some form of sudden adversity has
closed all other avenues to success.
Instead of relative rank, McCaffrey (1994) suggests that lottery buyers are seeking
large sums because of indivisibilities in consumption. Obviously, cars, houses, TVs and so
forth come in units. This argument requires both imperfections in credit markets leading to
constraints on the ability to borrow, and low substitutability between goods that would
undermine the discreteness of the consumption good. Thus a new car and a used car
would have to be less substitutable than a demand for transportation alone would suggest.
Interestingly, the LLDAs are consistent with the lump-sum argument. First, ROSCAS
(rotating savings and credit associations) are also commonly to be found in poor countries
(Morduch 1999). These provide lump sums through the deterministic mechanism of all
participants contributing to the pot each month with each participant drawing the pot in
turn until all have drawn. (Even so, the need to keep membership limited as part of the
enforcement mechanism limits the size of the lump sum that ROSCAs can mobilize.)
Second, as we have seen earlier, many LLDAs offer prizes that are consumer durables
such as apartments, cars, TVs, and the like.
If depositors in LLDAs are buying skewness or large lump sums, this demand
combined with a bounded top prize, leads one to expect that the usual LLDAs are likely to
be an inferior good. That is, wealthier people will spend a lower proportion of their wealth
on lottery-linked accounts than will poorer people (the income elasticity of demand is
probably less than 1). This conjecture is consistent with evidence on lottery participation.
Brown et al., (1992) find that the poor commit a greater portion of their income to
lotteries though the middle class provides the greatest total amount. Interestingly, they

14

found that education generally is the best predictor of the amount of an individual’s
propensity to play the lottery and correlates negatively with the propensity to play. The
reason for the correlation is an open question: education may proxy for class (a nonmonetary source of relative status), wealth, an improved understanding of probability, or
socialization to values that de-emphasize relative wealth.

4.0 Regulatory issues
The standard analysis suggests that in the case of new consumer goods that the public
eagerly accepts; the introduction of the new good creates new consumer surplus. This is
the position that Brinner and Clotfelter (1975) take with respect to state lotteries.
However this position has some limitations when there is the question of consumer
protection from what some would consider a harmful product. Still, the evidence suggests
that gamblers are able to detect differences in payout rates between types of games or
different slot machines and respond to these differences (Eadington 1999). This should not
be too surprising as the gamblers make many small bets with fast feedback; as Thaler
(2000) argues, this is the environment most conducive to economic rationality in decision
making. (Of course, the gamblers may simply be good at ranking different slot machines
against each other while still over-estimating absolute payoff rate.) The evidence that
gamblers are price sensitive suggests that for most gamblers the bets they undertake
provide a utility that is worth a known monetary cost. Still, the issue of addiction and
problem gambling remains a concern.
As Eadington (1999) points out, problem gambling is harmful, more or less by
definition. However there are few studies that estimate the social costs and these studies
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are fraught with conceptual difficulties. One problem is specifying and costing the base
case against which to evaluate the introduction of LLDAs. Furthermore, some of the
issues with casino gambling, the situation that Eadington describes, do not apply to
LLDAs. With LLDAs there is no casino town or district drawing criminals and requiring
additional policing. LLDAs also enforce a restraint in that the holder bets the interest not
the principal of his savings, and that at a rate that the bank controls. Of course, LLDAs
may still introduce some susceptible people to gambling who would otherwise not have
begun.
Interestingly, Minabe (1975) reports that when the Ministry of Finance originally
proposed LLDAs, the opposition criticized the idea. The opposition argued that LLDAs
would incite “the gambling spirit of the people and would have a poor educational effect.”
In response, the MOF constructed the lottery so that depositors would get at least
3%/annum; furthermore, it ensured that the lottery would have an expected value of
3.75%, which was the statutory maximum interest rate payable on time deposits.
The authors had an opportunity to discus LLDAs with regulators in three Latin
American countries: Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.3 An issue that did come up in
discussions with the Latin American regulators is the morality of gambling. However, this
was not an explicit factor in any of the three cases, and in all three countries the
government does sponsor lotteries.
The Chileans blocked the innovation when the Spanish banks proposed it. The reason
is that the Banco Central de Chile (BCC) has a policy of requiring banks to push all costs
into the interest rate. The BCC’s position is that markets need to “get prices right.” The
3

We base our assessment of the stance of the regulatory authorities on our interviews with them.
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argument is that if consumers cannot tell what their deposit are earning, they may not be
able to make wise decisions as to where to put their money. The BCC particularly wished
to prevent the occurrence of a situation where customers would open an account with a
shaky bank because of its lottery while ignoring the risk that the bank would fail. (Of
course, one could equally well worry that consumers might choose a bank on the basis of
its hours or location rather than its riskiness.)
The Banco Central de la República Argentina (BCRA) did not like the idea of the
LLDAs but it is not clear on what grounds rather than a general sense of disquiet. (Also, it
was foreign banks that were introducing the accounts and the local banks were opposed
due to an inability to compete.) However, the BCRA pointed out that Argentina is moving
to a more market-oriented economy and away from heavy-handed regulation. The
authorities therefore had no basis on which to intervene. Note however, that the accounts
do not qualify for deposit insurance.
In Mexico, the regulatory authorities appear not to have given the issue any thought
at all. The regulators we spoke with suggested that the banking system had such serious
problems that the question of the authorization of LLDAs was a third-order concern.
Unlike the situation in Argentina, the accounts qualify for deposit insurance.
As far as the US is concerned, our reading is that today, FDIC-insured state nonmember banks may not participate in lotteries. The wording of the regulation does not
directly address LLDAs, but does prohibit banks from participating in lotteries.
The only paper we have found that discusses the ethics of (state) lotteries (Stearns
and Borna 1995) points out that the state lotteries the authors examined apparently engage
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in ethically questionable advertising. Clotfelter and Cook (1991) also observed misleading
advertising with respect to the issue of participants picking winning numbers and in other
respects as well. Stearns and Borna (1995) argue that lotteries can be ethically acceptable
provided the offerers do not engage in misleading advertising and participants have ready
access to the information necessary to evaluate their chances of success. Interestingly, the
Spanish banks in Argentina and Mexico include as part of their LLDA programs phone
numbers that interested parties can call to determine the odds of winning. Given the
evidence on gamblers’ price elasticity of gambling, we can suspect that the banks’
willingness to provide the information is driven as much by competition between banks as
by any sense of ethics.

5.0 Conclusion
LLDAs are ubiquitous and one can expect that they will become even more available
through Internet banking. Currently, access to the Internet probably correlates negatively
with interest in such accounts as computer owners tend to be among society’s better off.
Still, this is changing. Furthermore, the accounts have proved popular in developing
countries. As such, they merit further research. Useful directions include the following.
Does the introduction of LLDAs simply cannibalize existing savings or do the
accounts generate new savings? We know that the accounts are popular but there are no
studies that look at the effects on total savings.
Does the introduction of LLDAs cannibalize government-sponsored lotteries? As a
first approximation one can expect that these private lotteries are closer to a fair bet than
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are the state lotteries. They therefore are cheaper to the participant and so one can expect
both substitution and an increase in the market for gambling.
Do LLDAs decrease or increase the harm from gambling to susceptible individuals?
The harm from gambling comes from losing so bets that are closer to fair do less harm
than do state-sponsored lotteries. However, any increase in the number of problem
gamblers attributable to the introduction of LLDAs (the slippery slope argument)
obviously reduces this benefit.
Regardless of one’s opinion of gambling and the moral appropriateness of LLDAs as
a product, LLDAs exist and are likely to become even more widespread. They therefore
merit further investigation.
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Table 1: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya’s lottery-linked deposit account, el Libreton, is off to a
strong start
Country
Launch date
No. of accounts
Total volume
Vol./Acct.
(thousands)
(US$ millions)
(US$)
Mexico
Aug 96
485
178
367
Colombia
Jul 97
462
205
443
Venezuela
May 97
697
642
921
Argentina
Dec 97
78
232
2,949
Source: BBV internal document for Feb. 1998

